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NOTES AND COMMENTS
procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable" ;27 and
in giving the reasons for holding the search there concerned reasonable,
he said: "The place of arrest was a business room to which the public,
including officers, was invited, the room was small and under the im-
mediate and complete control of the defendant, and the search did not
extend beyond the room used for the unlawful purpose." (Emphasis
added.) 28  Therefore, even though Justice Minton used the phrase
"reasonable under the circumstances," he, nevertheless, applied the same
criterion of reason found in previous cases. Thus, it can be seen that
the Rabinowitz case neither extended the limits of search incident to
arrest nor set up a new criterion for determining the reasonableness of
such a search.
If homes can be searched and property seized as in the principal case,
and such property held and used as evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value and
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. To permit a search of
the defendant's home when he is arrested outside the home is, in itself,
,an unreasonable extension of the right to search incident to arrest; but,
to permit his home to be searched as incident to the arrest of a third
party outside his home is an even greater encroachment upon the Con-
stitutional guaranty; for in such a case the privacy of the owner is in-
volved and not that of the arrestee.
JERRY A. CAMPBELL.
Evidence-Admissibility of Partially Inaudible Recordings
Since the ascertainment of truth is the ultimate aim of our judicial
system, and because memory plays an important role in helping to
realize that goal, it is not surprising that more and more scientific de-
vices which aid in evaluating the uncertain memories of men have found
their way into the courts.' The use of sound recordings as a means of
proof is an example of how a scientific device can supplement or, in
some cases, supplant the testimony of human witnesses in litigation.
2
The problem of the introduction into evidence of mechanically pre-
served sound is not new. As far back as 1906, in a suit for damages
because of an alleged diminution of property value due to noise, the
2- Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U. S. 56, 66 (1950).
28 Id. at 64.
1 For a discussion of the development of the use of scientific devices in the
courtroom, see Baer, Radar Goes to Court, 33 N. C. L. Rtv. 355 (1955).' For a discussion of the problems and advantages involved in the use of mag-
netic tape recordings as a means of proof and as a means of recording courtroom
proceedings, see Conrad, Magnetic Recordings in the Courts, 40 VA. L. REV. 23
(1954).
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Michigan court allowed a phonograph recording of sounds claimed to be
incident to defendant's business to be played before the jury.3 The ac-
ceptance of such evidence has an obvious advantage, which accrues
to both judges and jurors: 4 it permits not only the proof by human
witnesses of the making of the sounds, but also a reproduction of the
sounds themselves by means of a mechanical witness. The disadvan-
tages5 involved in the use of recorded evidence, especially in the area of
confessions, are not so obvious. One of them-the introduction into
evidence of a partially inaudible recording-will be discussed herein.
As with any other form of scientific evidence, a proper foundation
must be laid in order to introduce a recording into evidence. What
should constitute laying a proper foundation for introducing a recording
into evidence is succinctly set out in the recent Georgia case of Steve M.
Solomon, Inc. v. Edgar:
6
"(1) It must be shown that the mechanical transcription device
was capable of taking testimony. (2) It must be shown that the
operator of the device was competent to operate the device. (3)
The authenticity and correctness of the recording must be estab-
lished. (4) It must be shown that changes, additions, or dele-
tions have not been made. (5) The manner of preservation of
the record must be shown. (6) Speakers must be identified. (7)
'Boyne City, G. & A. R. R. v. Anderson, 146 Mich. 328, 109 N.W. 429 (1906).
For a review of later cases sustaining the admission of recorded sound into evi-
dence, see Annot., 168 A. L. R. 927 (1947).
'"The wire recorder which reproduces the actual voice of the accused and
those who may be questioning him should be of much more value to the court and
the jury than a confession taken in shorthand and later reduced to writing, especi-
ally where an issue has been raised as to whether the confession was voluntarily
made." Williams v. State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, -, 226 P. 2d 989, 995 (1951) ; in
People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 499, 197 P. 2d 1, 5 (1948), the court, referring to
sound movies, made a comment equally applicable to recordings: "Moreover, as a
method of presenting confessions, [they] appear to have a unique advantage in that
while presenting the admission of guilt, they simultaneously testify to facts relevant
to the issue of volition."
E.g., Wright v. State, 79 So. 2d 66 (Ala. App. 1954) (accused's own voice
might unduly impress jury) ; People v. Stephens, 117 Cal. App. 2d 653, 256 P. 2d
1033 (1953) (recordings inadmissible because inaudible, unintelligible, and con-
taining extraneous inadmissible matter) ; People v. King, 101 Cal. App. 2d 500, 225
P. 2d 950 (1950) (re-recordngs of intentionally destroyed original recordings in-
admissible because not best evidence); Leeth v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 61, 230
P. 2d 942 (1951) (recorded conversation between county attorney and co-defendant
inadmissible against defendant as hearsay and incompetent) ; Hunter v. Hunter,
169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A. 2d 401 (1951) (recordings inadmissible because self-
serving, violative of privileged husband-wife communication, and of very poor
quality).
Mechanical disadvantages of the use of recordings in evidence include the fra-
gility of wire and tape recordings; the breakability of disc recordings; and the
ease with which wire and tape recordings can be spliced, erased, altered, etc.
a88 S. E. 2d 167 (Ga. App. 1955). See also Leeth v. State, 94 Okla. Crim.




It must be shown that the testimony elicited was freely and vol-
untarily made, without any kind of duress."
With such a foundation required, it would seem that there could
arise few, if any, problems concerning the admissibility of mechanically
recorded sound into evidence. Nevertheless, in the area of recorded
confessions and admissions, even the laying of such a foundation as
suggested above does not necessarily solve the problem presented by a
mechanically defective recording, such as one which is partially in-
audible.
As with the more common written or oral confession, the trial judge,
in most states, must pass upon the voluntariness of the confession before
it is permitted to be put into evidence.8  Where a recorded confession
is involved, it has been said to be within the discretion of the trial judge
to determine, at the same time he decides upon the voluntariness of the
confession, whether the recording is sufficiently audible and coherent to
be of any probative value to the jury.9 After the proper foundation is
laid, and the voluntariness of a partially inaudible recorded confession
is established, the problem of its introduction into evidence boils down
to this: How far should the courts go in treating this evidence like
ordinary written or oral testimony?
Suppose defendant is indicted for the murder of Mr. Victim. After
his arrest, while he is being escorted into the police station by the arrest-
ing officer, a passer-by overhears part of a conversation between de-
fendant and the arresting officer, as follows: Officer: "Did you kill Mr.
Victim?" Defendant: "Yes." The passer-by continues walking past
the police station and hears no more of the conversation. For all he
knows, defendant, following his "Yes" answer, might have added: "But
I killed him in self defense." Without a doubt the passer-by would be
permitted, at defendant's trial for murder, to testify to the portion of
the conversation between defendant and the arresting officer which he
overheard, even though his testimony, standing alone, might be com-
pletely misleading. 10 Should a recorded confession or admission which
might conceivably be just as misleading because of the inaudibility of
portions of the defendant's statement be allowed into evidence just as the
testimony of the passer-by in the hypothetical posed?
A California court in the case of People v. Porter" felt that this
question should be answered in the affirmative. In that case the de-
7 Steve M. Solomon, Inc. v. Edgar, 88 S. E. 2d 167, 171 (Ga. App. 1955).
'20 Am. JuR., Evidence §§ 532-534 (1939).
' State v. Lorain, 141 Conn. 694, 109 A. 2d 504 (1954) ; State v. Alleman, 218
La. 821, 51 So. 2d 83 (1950) ; Leeth v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 61, 230 P. 2d 942
(1951) ; State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950) ; State v. Salle,
34 Wash. 2d 183, 208 P. 2d 872 (1949).
1020 Am. JOE., Evidence § 531 (1939).
"105 Cal. App. 2d 324, 233 P. 2d 102 (1951).
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fendants were convicted of murder. On appeal, the admission of re-
recordings (made to reduce background noises) of the original wire re-
cording of a conversation between the defendants in the district at-
torney's office was claimed to be error on the ground that the recordings
did not reflect the entire conversation. The appellate court affirmed the
conviction and said that "such objection is without merit since a wit-
ness may testify to part of a conversation if that is all he heard and it
appears to be intelligible."'1 2  Several other courts have adopted the
same position, that the mere fact that some portion of a recording is in-
audible does not render the entire recording inadmissible."8
The danger inherent in this position is aptly pointed out in the
recent Alabama case of Wright v. State:1
4
"Mechanical methods of presenting evidence . . . can well
serve in bringing the truth to the trier of facts. A search for the
truth is the ultimate end of all legal proceedings. The value of
this type of evidence however depends upon its inherent accuracy.
Inaccurately produced mechanical evidence may distort the truth
instead of producing it. While courts accept scientific aids which
contribute to the ascertainment of the truth, enthusiasm for the
modern should never be permitted to endanger the safeguards of
personal liberties patiently erected by the legal architects through
the years....
"We think there is probable danger to the rights of an ac-
cused if the approach to the solution of the question [of the ad-
missibility of partially inaudible recorded confessions] be made
by a mechanical application by analogy of principles developed
as to written or oral confessions which are placed in evidence
through the medium of a third party. An accused's own voice
reciting events must undoubtedly greatly impress a jury. For
" Id. at -, 233 P. 2d at 107."2 People v. Jackson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 776, 271 P. 2d 196 (1954) ; Williams v.
State, 93 Okla. Crim. 260, 226 P. 2d 989 (1951) ; State v. Salle, 34 Wash. 2d 183,
208 P. 2d 872 (1949); United States v. Schanerman, 150 F. 2d 941 (3rd Cir.
1945) (dictum) ; State v. Gensmer, 235 Minn. 72, 51 N. W. 2d 680 (1951), cert.
denied sub moin. Gensmer v. Minn., 344 U. S. 824 (1952) (dictum). But see
State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950) (recording not admissible
if in the trial judge's discretion it is too fragmentary and incoherent to be of
probative value).
14 79 So. 2d 66 (Ala. App. 1954). Defendant was indicted and convicted of
second degree murder for running over a woman while allegedly driving his car.
In a recorded question and answer session at the police station, defendant admitted
driving the car at the time of the accident. At the trial defendant claimed he was
not the driver and objected to the trial court's permitting the prosecuion to put the
recording into evidence on the ground that parts of it were inaudible. Conviction
was reversed on other grounds, but the court made several comments and sug-
gestions concerning the use of recorded confessions.
[Vol. 34
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this very reason it is essential that all material statements be
accurately recorded....
In a divorce case, Hunter v. Hunter,16 a Pennsylvania court ap-
parently took the extreme opposite position from that taken in the Porter
case: a recorded conversation should be treated as analogous to a
writing17 or a deposition' sought to be introduced into evidence. Its
position was that the entire conversation must be audible or the whole
recording is inadmissible.
But the position of the Hunter case is probably just as unsound
as that taken by the Porter case. Conceivably, the only inaudible por-
tions of a recorded question-and-answer-type confession might be the
answers to immaterial questions. To exclude such a recording for that
reason alone would hardly be fair to the prosecution. It would impede
rather than expedite the ascertainment of the truth.
It would seem that in the area of recorded confessions, parts of which
are inaudible, some middle ground should be taken with regard to their
admissibility. If the recorded evidence is of the question and answer
variety, this middle ground would seem to be fairly obvious: where all
the questions are audible and only the answers to immaterial questions
are inaudible, then the recording, if otherwise unobjectionable, should
be admitted into evidence. Unhappily, not all situations present such
obvious answers. The Washington court in State v. Slater 9 came up
with what in many cases is probably the only practical "answer" to the
problem of fragmentary recordings: "Whether or not what can be heard
on the playing of such a recording is sufficiently audible and coherent
to have any probative value is a matter which should rest largely in the
discretion of the trial judge."
20
It should be noted that even in cases in which partially inaudible
recordings are held to be inadmissible to prove the statements contained
in them, they might nevertheless be sufficiently coherent to be admissible
for such purposes as impeachment 2 ' or corroboration.
22
The Alabama court in Wright v. State23 has demonstrated a keen
insight into the problems incident to the introduction into evidence of
11;1d. at 71-72.
" 169 Pa. Super. 498, 83 A. 2d 401 (1951).
" Generally, the entire writing, or at least all material parts of it, must be
offered or none of it is admissible. 20 Am. JuR., Evidence § 914 (1939).
" Generally, a deposition must go into evidence in whole or not at all, unless it
is shown that introduction of only part will not operate unfairly against the
opposite party. 16 Am. JUR., Depositions § 118 (1938).
1" 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950).
0 Id. at 364, 218 P. 2d at 333.
" State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 242 P. 2d 984 (1952).
22 State v. Slater, 36 Wash. 2d 357, 218 P. 2d 329 (1950).
" 79 So. 2d 66 (Ala. App. 1954).
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a mechanically defective recording of a confession or admission. Its
suggestions should prove valuable to courts which have not yet passed
on the question:
"To insure the accused of the absolute protection of his rights
to which he is entitled under the charitable policy of our criminal
laws, and assuming that the voluntary character and the accuracy
of the recording device has been established, we make the fol-
lowing suggestions as to trial procedure in the event an objection
is interposed to the introduction of a recorded statement on the
grounds that such statement is inaudible, or contains illegal, ir-
relevant, incompetent, or immaterial evidence.
"The trial court should first have the recording played or run
off before it out of the presence of the jury, counsel being afforded
the opportunity at this time of interposing appropriate objec-
tions. A transcription of the audible portions of the statement
should of course be made at this time.
"If either of such defects infect the recording there can be
doubt as to its admissibility.
"If the recording is inaudible in those portions likely to con-
tain statements material to the issues, the recording should be
rejected if it is the only evidence offered as to the statement.
"Since most recordings are in question and answer form, the
question itself will shed light on the probable materiality of the
answer.
"If the parties who were present when the recording was
made are available and testify as to the statements made, the
recording, even though inaudible, in parts, should be admitted
as corroborative of the testimony of the witness or witnesses
testifying to the statement....
"If the recording contains illegal evidence it should be re-
jected unless such illegal portions can be erased from the tape, or
kept from the jury by stopping and starting the playing instru-
ment. This for the reason, as before stated, we doubt the effec-
tiveness of oral instructions to eradicate the prejudicial effect of
this type of evidence because of its inherent potency."
24
WILLIAm E. ZIMTBAUM.
Federal jurisdiction-Suits Against a State
A recent case, Lowes v. Manhattan City School District,' presents
some of the problems facing a federal court when it concludes the suit
2 'Id. at 73-74.
'222 F. 2d 258 (9th Cir. 1955).
[Vol. 34
